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In earLy 1983; the Community economy is hesitating.
1 . Recent indicators point to some incipient r.ecovery in a number of
Member States that is attributable in part to the more favourable trend
of the US economy since the end of 1982, to the downward movement in
interest rates international Ly and, with some reservations, to the
prospe~t of an easing of the oi l constraint.
This does not mean that the end to the recession is already assured.
The favourable deveLopments observed still need to be confirmed as to
their scale and duration. In addition , many of the worldl s economies
have not as yet adjusted sufficiently to the consequences of the 1979
oi l shock and the trend in the dollar since 1980. The international
financial situation also needs to be closely monitored.
There is thus the chance of a positive turnaround, but there are also
uncertai nt ies. This chance to start bringing down unemployment through
non-intLationar, and hence sustained growth is offered to us for the first
time 'in several years and must be seized.
For This reason, the ways and rr:eans of accentuating the favourable
tendencies and initiating a period of sound growth must be the main point
of the debate that is started at this European Council , wi Ll continue 
the GECD and at the Williamsburg Summit, and '.rill be completed at the
Europ.ean Council to be held in June.
This memorandum should help to launch the d-iscussion and prepare the
ground for follow-up action at Comm~nity level:
- it gives a brief description of the current economic situation and of
the outlook tor the irnmedi ate future
- and sets out d numbel' of thoughts on how to manage the recovery, that
i~ to s~y on how to reinforce it and make it Last.- 2 -
II . The present situation and immediate outlook
Developments in 1982
1 . On account of a very pronounced fall-off in the third quarter , growth
in the Community in 1982 was weaker than forecast: it was 0. 2% in volume
terms, with Denmark showing the largest increase of 2.3% and Germany and
the Netherlands recording declines of 1% and 1. 5% respectively. This
experience was common to all the industrialized countries, their real
outpUt falling in 1982 for the first time since 1975.
Much of the deterioration was due to the combined impact of:
- a worsening in the recession in the United States , where real GDP
declined by 1.7%;
- a contraction in world trade attributable to cyclical conditions but
also to the growing difficulties in international financing. Wor ld
trade, which had expanded at an average annual rate of 6. 9% in volume
terms between 1976 and 1979 , decl ined by 1. 5% in 1982, after having
been flat in 1981.
The number of people out of work continued to cl imb , to reach 9.
of the Labour force in 1982 On average, l. e. a level 75% higher than in
1979. As a result , unemployment in the Community, whi ch , on average
has not shown any contraction since 1973 , has risen steadi Ly since
1978/79.
Two more positive aspects should be stressed:
- inflation , whi~h dropped from 11.8% in 1981 to 10. 5% in 1982, has eased
in all Member States. However , the slowdown is less pronounced than in
the United States or Japan and , what is more, quite marked divergences
are sti Ll discernible within the Community. Inflation is below 6% in
Germany ",od the NetherLand~ and has been brought down from 15.5% in
1980 to 8. 5/~ in 1982 in the United Kingdom but it is still running at
over '15Z in Greece , Ire! and and Italy;:
for the Cof1;l"/lunity as a whoLe, progress in bringing the current account
of the balance of payments back into equi librium has been faster than
anticipated; the deficit was equivalent to only 0. 5% of GDP in 1982
compared with 1. 3% in 1980.- 3 -
Here too , the overall result masks sharp divergences between Member States.
Belgium, Denmark , Greece , France, Ireland and itaLy are in deficit whi 
Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom are running a
surplus , in some cases a large one.
Out look for 1983
The forecasts at present avai lable for 1983 are subject to three external
factors of uncertai nty:
- the first is the scale and duration of the US recovery, which are bound up
inter alia with the prospects for interest rates , themseLves dependent to
a large degree on how developments in the Federal budget deficit wi II affect
monetary pol icy;
the second factor of uncertainty has to do with international financial
deve lopment s;
- lastly, there is no way of knowing at the moment what the full extent or
effects of the fall in oi l pri ces wi II be.
Confirmation of the upturn in the US economy and , under certain conditions
J decline in oil prices should make it easier for the European economy to pick
up again , aLthough the combined effect of these two factors cannot be expected
to alter fundamentally the profi le for '1983.
The poor performance in the third quarter of 1982 has made it necessary to
revise the GDP forecast for 1983 downwards for virtually all Member States
(an increase of only 0.11% in volume terms compared with one of just over 1%
forecast at the end of last yea r)- Grow~h is expected to pi ck up duri ng ~he
second half of the year , helped by restocking, some support from public-sector
demand and a recovery in exports , whi le private consumption and, at Least '
the first half of 1983 , investment are unlikely to make any major contribution
to a revival in activity.
These forecasts are based on a very caut ious assumpt ion regarding oi 1 pri ces-
ALL in aLL , in the present cyclical situation , the strength and duration of the
hesitant exp~nsion which is now getting under way are not assured even if the
tendency toward::, reC01!"!ry W;:(2 to be more pronounced than expected.- 4 -
3. According to present forecasts , there wi lL probably be a further
slowdown in the rate of inflation: in 1983 , this rate is Likely to be
6% for the Community as a whole , which is the lowest for seven years
(with the exception of 1978 when it was 7.1%). Whi le the need for
consol idation remains as pressing as ever and differences in inflation
rates will not disappear, 1983 is likely to see some narrowing of the
differences in price rises within the Community: the rate of inflation
will probably be slow in the Federal Republic of Germany and the
Netherlands and relatively moderate in many countries (Belgium, Denmark
Luxembourg, France and the United Kingdom).
Unemployment, on the other hand , is likely to continue to rise in
1983 throughout the Community: the average rate of unemployment as a
proportion of the labour force will easily exceed 10% in 1983, giving
a total of more than 12 mi Llion jobless; the rates of increase will
vary from one Member State to another.
The prospects in 1983 should see further improved equi l ibrium in
the balance of payments on current account , with the deficit for the
Community as a whole likely to fall to approximately 0. 3% of  GDP
notably as a result of reduced deficits in Belgium, Denmark , France,
Ireland and Italy.
III. Guidelines
Despite the modest outlook for growth and the present uncertainties,
there is a possibi l ity of a change of trend , of a gradual upturn in the
economy and therefore of a check to .and then a reversal of the une(nploy-
ment trend. If we miss this opportunity, the danger of continued
stagnation is likely to increase. It is therefore more than ever necessary
to defi ne a common approach wh i ch can encompass the vari ous element s of
healthy and sustained growth.
The following three lessons can be drawn from the experience of recent
years:
(a) The crisis, which is both cyclical and structural in nature, calls
for national policies "ihich are directed equally to~Jards stability
(the fight against inflation) and - if the employment problem is to
be solved - towards the df:velopment of productive activities through
creation of the conditions necessary for growth (improvements in
supply, investment , mobility and competitiveness).
cooperation will remove the need for such efferts.
No international- 5 -
Cb) The Commun'j ty, whi ch is a large integrated market helping, through
the EMS, to pull individual pol ides closer together and so to
make them more effective , which acts as a catalyst for the strategies
pursued in the fieLds of investment , industrial development and energy,
and which is an influential spokesman in dealings with the outside
world, is an asset which must be exploited at all costs. Th is theme
1S one which constantly underlies the Commission s actions and which
he European Counc i l has begun to examine. The fact that it is not
set out in detai l in thi s Communi cation in no way lessens the degree
of priority it is given nor the obligation to observe the programmes
laid down and to propose new courses of action.
(c) Economies are now so interdependent that no national policy can be
sure of success without an orderly external framework. It is this
order which is lacking, depriving economies and firms of a suffici-
ent Ly stab le envi ronment , distol,t ing expectations and alteri ng
management conditions through abrupt and unforeseen chimges which do
not reflect economic fundamentals. The economies wh i ch are most
market-oriented cannot endure the present level of disorganization
in the international economic system. Here lies a lso one of the
dangers of rising protectionism " which we must join forces to roll
back. The Comm~nitf must cooperate with its m~~n partners in order
to assure ~he international conditions of a recovery - parti~ularly in
trade" financial ; monetary and interest rate policies , but also in
the economic domain proper.
This document , drawn up ahead of important international meetings, 
largely centred on this final aspect. If recovery is to be brought dbout
it is not so mu~h  d hoc measures , however 1; I'm they may be, but rather the
awareness of interdep(:ndence ,3nd the manner of administering that -inter-
dependence more effectively which must form the substance of future concerted
action.
It is with th";:, -in mind that the Commission , aware that the evidence
whi ch it has ci (ed ;c; now beqin.ling LO be generiJlLy accepted , pf'oposes that
discussions should ;;o\;er five fw;nts relating to the strengthening of inter--
national economL (): ~3&iizot' l(Jn  Of'  to the search for a cohesion in national
policies whi~h wi II Improve the chances of a return to growth.- 6 -
The security of the internationaL financial system
1. The level , in absolute terms, of the indebtedness of the developing
countries , the level of real interest rates and the effects of stagnation
have created strains in the international financial system. Reactions
have been rapid and effective: the amendment of the General Arrangements
to Borrow, the increase in IMF quotas and th~ way in which a number of
specific cases have been settled all bear witness to this fact.
2. These results do not obviate the need for continued and more thorough-
going work to consol idate a sti II fragi le situation. In addition to the
decisions already taken, lessons must be Learnt from developments which
the western world has been unable to ward off.
Priority must be given to establishing an information and monitoring
mechanism, to reinforcing the capacity OT the international financial
system as a whole to react , and to improving preventive machinery. 
these various fields, the Community must define common positions and co-
operate with its partners in order fi rst to consol idate the results
achieved and then to estabLish means of preventing a repetition of similar
situations.
The solutions adopted wi II have to take account of a second factor:
one of the reasons for the present stagnation lies in the low level of
i nt ernat iona l demand. The Community and its Member States must therefore
actively help to maintain an adequate flow of funds to the developing
countries , both via the banking sector and through official development
aid. The aim must be to carry out the necessary adjustment and at the
same time to maintain international trade at an adequate Level.
This last point is all the more important in that the health of the
international financial system wi II depend greatly - through the develop-
ment of trade , improved terms of tr"de and the reduction of indebtedness -
on strong and Last ing growth.- 7 -
The stabi li ty Df the international monetary system
One of the major lessons to be learnt from recent events is that the
international economy can no longer \~ithstand upheavals in its essential
component s. Thi s applies not only to energy prices and interest rates,
but aLso to exchange rates.
Volatile exchange rates, whose financial function is ominously tending
to supplant the trade function:
- make business decisions more difficult at a time when a vigorous
investment effort is a key condition for recovery;
above all ; disrupt trade relations to an intolerable extent , and jeopardize
the maintenance of free trade.
The EMS , an essential element of stability, has shown, despite its
setbacks, the value of systematic monetary cooperation. It is a major
asset for internal Community purposes and a valuable means of influencing
international monetary developments. Consequent l y:
- the Ccunci l of f~inisters , and subsequently the European Counci l , should
give careful thought to strengthening it and extending it to include
sterl ing and the drachma;
- for the reasons whi ch led to the setting up of the EMS and for basic
economic reasons, the Community must get its partners to share its
determination to stabi l ize international exchange rate relationships.
A step in thi s di rection was taken at the Versai lles summit. The
Community must not be content ~Jith adopting a common position on the follow-
up to the study of intervention problems. It must also persuade the United
States and Japan of the importance of bri nging exchange rates more into
Line with economic facts and of bringing down real interest rates. It must
put across to them its view of how monetary ~ooperati on should be organi zed.
The Commission vnll put toniard guidelines for this purpose and hopes that
a Community position on these points can be voiced clearly at Williamsburg.- 8 -
Oi l prices , growth and energy policy
The recent drop in oi l prices is likely under certa'in conditions to
produce a moderate but real inc rease in growth, and thi s i s to be welcomed.
However , the net results are difficult to forecast in any detai l: they
wi II depend on the impact of physical , financial and psychological threshold
effects. Price falls that are visible but smooth are likely to be beneficial
in terms of prices , external equi l ibrium and growth , without affecting unduly
the pursuit of energy policy. But tumbling prices would jeopardize the policy
on energy restructuring and impose strains on the international financial and
trade equilibrium.
The Community must therefore help to keep matters on an even keel; this
requires close cooperation with the Community s partners , notably the
industriaLized countries ; so as to ensure .a common view and consistent
attitudes , including, if necessary, the pr'ovision of safety nets.
In this area of essential importance for economi~ growth and the pursuit
of energy objectives , the Community must establish it~ general approach at
the highest level. It wi Ll then be for the Commission and the Counci l of
Ministers to implement it and tallow up its effects.- 9 ~
!) .
Monetar' y pol i cy
1 . In last December s guidelines, priority was given, wherever economic policy
conditions allowed, to the pursuit of monetary policies that would make for a
fall in real interest rates and underpin the recovery ingrowth.
2. The Commission proposes that the European Council confirm this priority.
It is a key element in consolidating the recovery both within the Community
and internationaLLy, especially as a fall  in  real intere.st rates is the best
way of stimulating investment and reducing the burden of internal and external
indebtedness.
It is therefor-e essenti.al that those 111ember States whi ch have been the
first to achieve favourable results in terms of inflation and the balance of
payments (the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands and the United
Kingdom) should pursue thei r Rlonetary pol icy with the degree of flexibi l ity
and openness that is consistent with a steady and lasting fall in re.al interest
rates. Closer monetary policy coordination and greater effol' ts to achieve
economi c convergence with in the H1SwQuld help to extend the benefits of this
poli cy to the whole of the Communi ty-
.J . The same need to provide rapid support for the early signs of recovery is
evident at international level , espe~ially as the results achieved in the
United States wi II be decisive even for the success of our own efforts. The
Community must endeavour to gN its ma-in partners to recognize explicitly the
central role of lower interest rates in improving the economic situation and
the need to pursue the measures that wi II allow this objective to be attained
and to aff-irm their desire to establish the necessary close cooperation.- 10 -
Publ ic finance
With regard to public finance, the two-pronged approach adopted in December
remains entirely valid. The fi rst element was the steadfast pursui t of efforts
to bring the deficits and the growth of the budget aggregates under control and
to change the emphasis of budget structures , with a shift towards investment.
But provided that this general line was observed, a second element was that in
certain Member States, for example the Federal Republic of Germany and the
United Kingdom, when the results of current policies permitted, public finance
r;ould be used to fuel the upturn, in fostering the development of productive
~ctivities by stimulating investment, adjusting taxation or reducing company
costs.
At any event , the present situatiDn holds out two definite; and one possible,
courses of action for these few countries in the use of public expenditure:
- the basic principle to be !'espected absolutely must be to restore or to
reinforce confidence in governments ' abi lity to bring budgets under control;
this means that every instance of the use of public finance must be
compatibLe with the fight against inflation , must comply with the imperatives
for restructuring public expenditure, and must not impede the rundown of the
deficits; these are the essentials for credibi lity in a situation where lack
of confidence is rife;
' ,,
- even if the "automatic sta 1 llers mus  1n any event , operate on the
ossumption that deveLopments are disappointing, they must not be allowed
with the first uncertain signs of recovery.. to move prematurely in the
direction of lowering deficits;
Lastly, despite the hopes that the economic situation wi II improve, shouLd
it not do so as rapidLy and as substantialLy as wished , there is no reason
why, in the present situation , certain Member States should rule out the use
ot cyc l i cal budgetary action whi ch satisfies the above conditions and wi II
consolidate an upturn which is still hesitant.
Sy " automatic stdbilizers i~; ifleont those pubLic expenditures or receirJts
whose impact tends to ~,tli~UidlY eccmomjc fluctudtion'- 1~ -
The question whether- to pursue such a course of action must be decided
soon, i. e. as soon as the facts are clearer , so that if it is decided
to go ahead act ion can be taken at the right time in the cycle. The
decisicn ought to be taken as part of the process of determining inter-
nationally coordinated economic action in the few we.eks between the
next European Counci l meeting and the Wi It iamsburg Summit.
To permit Europe to approach the forthcoming international meetings in a
position ()f wit iative, the European Counci l should approve the proposed
guidel ines on the five main domains of action indicated above, and take
the procedural decisions necessary for the Counci l of Ministers to assure
thei r rapid and precise implementation.(;R
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